The Stability Predicate S is the important thing. V is generic over the Stable Core = (L[S],S). As far as I know, V may not be generic over HOD; but it is generic over (HOD,S).
V is always a symmetric extension of HOD but maybe you have something else in mind.
Let A be a V-generic class of ordinals (so A codes V). Then A is (HOD, P)-generic for a class partial order P which is definable in V. So if T is the \Sigma_2-theory of the ordinals then P is definable in (HOD,T) and A is generic over (HOD,T).
Why are you stating a weaker result than mine? I show that for some A, (V,A) models ZFC and is generic over the Stable Core and hence over (HOD,S) where S is the Stability predicate. The Stability Predicate is , not . And a crucial point is that its only reference to truth in V is via the “stability relationships” between ‘s, a much more absolute property than truth which is much easier to analyse. As I said, the Stability Predicate is the important thing in my conjecture.
But you did not answer my question. Are you just really conjecturing that if V is generic over N then there is no nontrivial ?
But I did answer your question: The Stability Predicate is the basis for my conjecture, not just some arbitrary predicate that makes V generic over HOD. In fact my conjecture looks stronger than the rigidity of (HOD,S), as the Stable Core (L[S],S) is smaller.
Let me phrase this more precisely.
Suppose A is a V-generic class of ordinals, N is an inner model of V, P is a partial order which is amenable to N and that A is (N,P)-generic.
Are you conjecturing that there is no non-trivial ? Or that there is no nontrivial ? Or nothing along these general lines?
As I said: Nothing along those general lines.
I show that (in Morse-Kelley), the (enriched) Stable Core is rigid for “V-constructible” embeddings. That makes key use of the (enriched) Stability Predicate. I wouldn’t know how to handle a different predicate.
I would think that based on HP etc., you would actually conjecture that there is a nontrivial latex \Delta_2$ and not (changes of direction are permitted when necessary; witness the IMH being replaced by the ). And set-theoretic practice is the big daddy: If you investigate a maximality criterion which ZFC proves inconsistent then you have to revise what you are doing (is “all regular cardinals inaccessible in HOD” consistent? I think so, but may be wrong.)
Yet you propose to deduce the non existence of large cardinals at some level based on maximality considerations. I would do the reverse, revise maximality.
If the goal is to understand maximality then that would be cheating! You may have extrinsic reasons for wanting LCs as opposed to LCs in inner models (important note: for Reinhardt cardinals that would be the only option anyway!) but those reasons have no role in an analysis of maximality of V in height and width.
I guess this is yet another point we just disagree on.
But I still don’t have an answer to this question: “What theory of truth do you have? I.e. what do you consider evidence for the truth of set-theoretic statements?”
Have you read Pen’s “Defending the Axioms”, and if so, does her Thin Realist describe your views? And if so, do you have an argument that LC existence is necessary for “good set theory”?
PS: With embarrassment and apologies to the group, I have to report that I found a bug in my argument that maximality kills supercompacts. I’ll try to fix it and let you know what happens. I am very sorry for the premature claim.
Suppose that there is an extendible and that the HOD Conjecture fails. Then:
1) Every regular cardinal above the least extendible cardinal is measurable in HOD (so HOD computes no successors correctly above the least extendible cardinal).
2) Suppose is an inaccessible cardinal which is a limit of extendible cardinals. Then there is a club such that every is a regular cardinal in (and hence inaccessible in HOD).
So, if you fix the proof, you have proved the HOD Conjecture.
I’ll try not to let that scare me
But I’m also not suprised that there was a bug in my proof!